The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Motivating Example -- 1.2 Collusion within Porter's Five Forces -- 1.3 Difficulties of Collusion -- 1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion -- 1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion -- 1.6 Price Formation Process -- 1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion -- 1.8 Cartel Detection -- 1.9 Outline of the Book -- 1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion -- Part I. Collusion in Practice -- Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel -- 2.1 The Story Begins -- 2.2 Initiation of the Cartel -- 2.3 Market Share Division -- 2.4 Price Increases and Announcements -- 2.5 Sales Force Issues -- 2.6 Redistributions -- 2.7 Questions and Answers -- Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring -- 3.1 Preamble -- 3.2 The Instruction Begins -- 3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring -- 3.4 Ring Logistics -- 3.5 Ring Membership -- 3.6 Auctioneer's Response -- 3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments -- 3.8 Questions and Answers -- Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection -- 4.1 Preamble -- 4.2 The Seminar Begins -- 4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions -- 4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion -- 4.5 Questions and Answers -- Part II. Economics of Cartels -- Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels -- 5.1 Basics -- 5.2 Buyer Resistance -- 5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance -- 5.4 Collusive Outcomes -- 5.5 Incentives for Cheating -- 5.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels -- 6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution -- 6.2 Pricing Structures -- 6.3 Allocation Structures -- 6.4 Enforcement Structures -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation -- Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry -- 7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments.