The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency, and Stability : Essays in Honor of Stanley Reiter

edited by John O. Ledyard

This volume, honoring Professor Stanley Reiter, reviews his many contributions and of his students in the varied areas of mathematical studies in economics and management science. Topics include economic history, mechanism design, game theory, dynamics and stability, and the structure of the firm. The contributors, all of whom wrote expressly for this book, are : J.S. Jordan; K.R. Mount; D. Morano and M. Walker; S.R. Williams and R. Radner; J. Hughes; H. Sonnenschein; E. Ames; L.E. Davis and R.E. Gallman; D.G. Saari; T. van Zandt; E. Bennett; T. Marschak and S. Reichelstein; S.A. Matthews and A. Postlewaite; L. Hurwicz and E. Maskin

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Year of publication:	1994
Other Persons:	Ledyard, John O. (ed.)
Publisher:	Boston, MA : Springer US
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Dezentralisierung \| Decentralization
Description of contents:	Table of Contents [gbv.de]

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (XII, 443 p) online resource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	1 Information Flows Intrinsic to the Stability of Economic Equilibrium2 Mechanisms for the Realization of Equilibria -- 3 Convergence Theorems for a Class of Recursive Stochastic Algorithms -- 4 Efficiency in Partnership When the Joint Output is Uncertain -- 5 Institutional Choice and Institutional Transformation: Perspectives from the Colonial Experience -- 6 An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism -- 7 Structured Private Enterprise -- 8 The Last 1,945 sailing Ships -- 9 Sufficient Statistics, Utility Theory, and Mechanism Design -- 10 Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale -- 11 A Nash Solution for Multilateral Bargaining -- 12 Communication Requirements for Individual Agents in Networks and Hierarchies -- 13 On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games -- 14 Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets.
ISBN:	978-1-4615-2261-4 ; 978-1-4613-5953-1
Other identifiers:	10.1007/978-1-4615-2261-4 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013521699