The Economics of IPR Protection Policies: Reply
In a comment to my paper "The Economics of IPR Protection Policies," Martínez-Sánchez (2007) shows that in my model under certain conditions the presence of piracy increases the quantity produced by the legal monopolist firm. In this note, I show how the algebra used in Martínez-Sánchez (2007) may be misleading and clarify under what assumptions such a finding would emerge. Finally, I discuss the validity of the assumptions in my model that would yield such counterintuitive finding.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Gil, Ricard |
Published in: |
Review of Network Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1446-9022, ZDB-ID 2139394-1. - Vol. 6.2007, 4
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Publisher: |
De Gruyter |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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