The Economics of Mating Taboos in a Matching Model

The objective of this paper is to apply a matching model to identify structural differences contributing to black/white discrepancies in intermarriage behavior. I propose a measurement of type for each individual, and I also propose a general matching algorithm to solve for the acceptable pool of partners for each type of individual. Using samples from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1985-1996), I identify a distaste for intermarriage termed the mating taboo. I find that the mating taboo is severe, between 55-63 percent. The most important element affecting racial differences in intermarriage is chances in receiving marriage offers. This accounts for 30 percent of the intermarriage rate difference. The key compensating differential in family real-income is wage elasticity: it accounts for a 33-35 percent difference in income inequality between mixed-race families and same-race families