The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies.
In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. The authors develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. The authors' model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Chari, V V ; Jones, Larry E ; Marimon, Ramon |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 87.1997, 5, p. 957-76
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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