The Eeckhout Condition and the Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matching

We investigate an extensive form sequential matching game of perfect information. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential matching game leads to the unique stable matching when the Eeckhout Condition (2000) for existence of a unique stable matching holds, regardless of the sequence of agents. This result does not extend to preferences that violate the Eeckhout Condition, even if there is a unique stable matching.

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Year of publication:	2006-12-03
Authors:	Suh, Sang-Chul ; Wen, Quan
Institutions:	Society for Economic Dynamics - SED
Subject:	Matching \| unique stable matching \| subgame perfect equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	2006 Meeting Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2006 Meeting Papers Number 176
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069297