The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions
Year of publication: |
2000-10
|
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Authors: | Cantillon, Estelle |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | Auctions | asymmetries | anonymous mechanisms | benchmark | reduced competition |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2008), 62: 1-25 The price is None Number 1279 37 pages |
Classification: | D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; D44 - Auctions ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
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The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenues
Cantillon, Estelle, (2001)
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