The effect of franchise no-poaching restrictions on worker earnings

Brian Callaci, Matthew Gibson, Sérgio Pinto, Marshall Steinbaum, Matt Walsh

We evaluate the nationwide impact of the Washington State attorney general's 2018-2020 enforcement campaign against no-poach clauses in franchising contracts, which prohibited worker movement across locations within a chain. Implementing a staggered difference-indifferences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports from numerous industries, we estimate a 6 percent increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and a 4 percent increase in worker-reported earnings.

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Year of publication:	9-6-2024
Authors:	Callaci, Brian ; Gibson, Matthew ; Pinto, Sérgio ; Steinbaum, Marshall ; Walsh, Matt
Publisher:	Kalamazoo, MI : W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Subject:	Employer market power \| oligopsony \| monopsony \| franchising chains \| antitrust \| wages \| salaries \| Franchising \| Marktmacht \| Market power \| Lohn \| Wages \| Monopson \| Monopsony \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Upjohn Institute working papers. - Kalamazoo, Mich. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2164806-2. - Vol. 24, 405
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.17848/wp24-405 [DOI] hdl:10419/305457 [Handle]
Classification:	J42 - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets ; K21 - Antitrust Law ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015055680