The effect of high power financial incentives on excessive risk-taking behavior : an experimental examination
Year of publication: |
2017
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Authors: | Brink, Alisa G. ; Hobson, Jessen L. ; Stevens, Douglas E. |
Published in: |
Journal of management accounting research : JMAR. - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., ISSN 1049-2127, ZDB-ID 1101530-5. - Vol. 29.2017, 1, p. 13-29
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Subject: | excessive risk taking | financial incentives | incentive power | agency theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Experiment | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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