The Effect of Labor Unions on CEO Compensation

We find evidence that labor unions affect CEO compensation. First, we find that firms with strong unions pay their CEOs less. The negative effect is robust to various tests for endogeneity, including cross-sectional variations and a regression discontinuity design. Second, we find that CEO compensation is curbed before union contract negotiations, especially when the compensation is discretionary and the unions have a strong bargaining position. Third, we report that curbing CEO compensation mitigates the chance of a labor strike, thus providing a rationale for firms to pay CEOs less when facing strong unions

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Huang, Qianqian
Other Persons:	Jiang, Feng (contributor) ; Lie, Erik (contributor) ; Que, Tingting (contributor)
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Gewerkschaft \| Trade union \| Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft \| Union membership \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Arbeitskampf \| Industrial action

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (56 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 1, 2015 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1571811 [DOI]
Classification:	J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008943