The effect of lenders' dual holding on loan contract design : evidence from performance pricing provisions
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Lim, Jesslyn ; Do, Viet ; Vu, Tram |
Published in: |
Journal of banking & finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4266, ZDB-ID 752905-3. - Vol. 137.2022, p. 1-14
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Subject: | Performance pricing provision | Dual holding | Loan contract | Incentive alignment | Bank monitoring | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Schätzung | Estimation | Vertrag | Contract | Kredit | Credit | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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