The effect of monitoring on CEO compensation in a matching equilibrium
Year of publication: |
June 2018
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre ; Sahuguet, Nicolas |
Published in: |
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge University Press, ISSN 0022-1090, ZDB-ID 219406-5. - Vol. 53.2018, 3, p. 1297-1339
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Subject: | CEO compensation | CEO retention | corporate governance | monitoring | ownership structure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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