The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Thomas, Randall S. |
Other Persons: | Martin, Kenneth J. (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Shareholder Value | Shareholder value | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (62 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 4, 1999 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments Summer 1999 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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