The effectiveness of central bank independence vs policy rules
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Taylor, John B. |
Published in: |
Business economics : the journal of the National Association for Business Economists. - London : Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 0007-666X, ZDB-ID 963268-2. - Vol. 48.2013, 3, p. 155-162
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Subject: | policy rules | central bank independence | variability | tradeoff | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Theorie | Theory |
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