The effectiveness of collusion under antitrust immunity : the case of liner shipping conferences
Year of publication: |
1995
|
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Authors: | Clyde, Paul Steel ; Reitzes, James D. |
Institutions: | USA / Federal Trade Commission / Bureau of Economics (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Washington, DC : Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics |
Subject: | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Preiskartell | Price-fixing cartel | Preisregulierung | Price regulation | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Welt | World | USA | United States | Linienschifffahrt | Liner shipping |
Extent: | 56 S |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Amtsdruckschrift ; Government document ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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