The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

In this article we present an overview of our recent research on the effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. Our approach is based on the solution and estimation of a multilateral bargaining model which we use to investigate the consequences of constitutional features of parliamentary democracy for the formation and stability of coalition governments

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Diermeier, Daniel ; Eraslan, Hulya ; Merlo, Antonio
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Experiment \| Regierungskoalition \| Coalition government \| Demokratie \| Democracy \| Verfassung \| Constitution \| Parlamentarismus \| Parliamentary system \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Economic theory of democracy \| Verfassungsökonomik \| Constitutional economics

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (39 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 2003 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.484363 [DOI]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H19 - Structure and Scope of Government. Other ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073960