The effects of imperfect auditing on managerial compensation
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Baglioni, Angelo ; Colombo, Luca |
Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 20.2011, 4, p. 542-548
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Subject: | Imperfect auditing | Misreporting | Stock options | Managerial incentives | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Jahresabschlussprüfung | Financial statement audit |
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