The Effects of the Dispersion of Shareholdings on Performance of Owner Controlled Firms
The paper considers a model of the firm in which management acts to maximize share-holder welfare (i. e. owner controlled) and bargains over wages and employment with existing workers. The main result of the paper is that the performance of owner controlled firms will be independent of the dispersion of shareholdings for all values of shareholders non-firm wealth if and only if shareholders are risk neutral.
Year of publication: |
1987
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Authors: | GROUT, Paul A. ; LAISNEY, François |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 1987, 5, p. 77-87
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Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
Saved in:
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