The Efficiency of Multi-Unit Electricity Auctions

Using a complete information game-theoretic model, we analyze the performance of different electricity auction structures in attaining efficiency (i. e., least-cost dispatch). We find that an auction structure where generators are allowed to bid for load "slices" outperforms an auction structure where generators submit bids for different hours in the day.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Elmaghraby, Wedad ; Oren, Shmuel S.
Published in:	The Energy Journal. - International Association for Energy Economics - IAEE, ISSN 0195-6574. - Vol. Volume20.1999, Number 4, p. 89-116
Publisher:	International Association for Energy Economics - IAEE

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	F0 - International Economics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004986857