The efficiency principle in non-cooperative coalitional bargaining
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Okada, Akira |
Published in: |
The Japanese economic review : the journal of the Japanese Economic Association. - Richmond, Vic. : Wiley, ISSN 1352-4739, ZDB-ID 1335724-4. - Vol. 51.2000, 1, p. 34-50
|
Subject: | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Koalition | Coalition | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Theorie | Theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
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