The electronic mail game : strategic behavior under "almost common knowledge"
Year of publication: |
1989
|
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Authors: | Rubinstein, Ariel |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 79.1989, 3, p. 385-391
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Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Theorie | Theory |
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