The emergence and persistence of oligarchy : a dynamic model of endogenous political power
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Jeon, Jee Seon ; Hwang, Ilwoo |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 201.2022, p. 1-31
|
Subject: | Dynamic bargaining | Endogenous institution | Endogenous political power | Markov perfect equilibrium | Oligarchy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Macht | Power | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Oligarchie | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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