The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud.

We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Two of them are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Dionne, G.
Institutions:	HEC Montréal (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
Subject:	INFORMATION \| MORAL HAZARD \| INSURANCE

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Series:	Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	27 pages
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies ; C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models ; G11 - Portfolio Choice
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618705