The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Sasaki, Tatsuya |
Published in: |
Dynamic games and applications : DGA. - Boston : Birkhäuser, ISSN 2153-0785, ZDB-ID 2610271-7. - Vol. 4.2014, 3, p. 345-362
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Subject: | Evolutionary game theory | Public good games | Social dilemmas | Rewards | Punishment | Equilibrium selection | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Experiment | Kooperation | Cooperation |
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