The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nax, Heinrich H. ; Pradelski, Bary S. R. ; Young, H. Peyton |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Assignment Games | Cooperative Games | Core | Evolutionary Game Theory | Learning | Matching Markets |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 50.2013 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 749877928 [GVK] hdl:10419/74818 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.50 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
-
The evolution of core stability in decentralized matching markets
Nax, Heinrich H., (2013)
-
Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
Nax, Heinrich H., (2012)
-
The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets
Nax, Heinrich H., (2013)
- More ...
-
The evolution of core stability in decentralized matching markets
Nax, Heinrich H., (2012)
-
The evolution of core stability in decentralized matching markets
Nax, Heinrich H., (2013)
-
The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets
Nax, Heinrich H., (2013)
- More ...