The evolution of economic institutions as a propagation process
Based on some notions from recent game theoretic approaches to explain the emergence of institutions, a model is put forward which implies some generalizations and extensions. First, the evolution of institutions is interpreted as a diffusion process. This interpretation provides a general formal framework to cover both, the case of strategic and that of non-strategic interaction. Second, different forms of interdependency effects between the individuals involved are identified as making the crucial difference between the case where institutions emerge spontaneously in an unorganized form and the case where they do not. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | Witt, Ulrich |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 62.1989, 2, p. 155-172
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Phylogenetic footprints in organizational behavior
Witt, Ulrich, (2012)
-
Witt, Ulrich, (2008)
-
Economic cosmology and the evolutionary challenge
Gowdy, John M., (2012)
- More ...