The Evolution of Strategic Behaviour.
This paper is a selective survey of recent work on evolutionary models of games. It is shown how evolution, in a literal biological sense, may have generated the attitudes to risk that are the basis of strategic behavior. Such attitudes to risk may or may not conform to the expected utility theorem. Although strategic behavior itself is bound to be importantly influenced by nongenetic mechanisms, these mechanisms may remain analogous to biological inheritance, at least in special cases. The theory of evolutionary games derived in this way is sketched and applications to various coordination games are discussed.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Robson, Arthur J. |
Published in: |
Canadian Journal of Economics. - Canadian Economics Association - CEA. - Vol. 28.1995, 1, p. 17-41
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Publisher: |
Canadian Economics Association - CEA |
Saved in:
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