The evolutionary dynamics of audit

A critical issue in auditing is provisioning of reasonable assurance that the financial reports are free from material misstatements. The auditing detection problem can be viewed as a two-player game between the auditor and the auditee where the auditor aims at eliminating misstatements, reducing at the same time his audit efforts, while the auditee aims at benefiting from fraudulent financial reporting and defalcation.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Anastasopoulos, Nikolaos P. ; Anastasopoulos, Markos P.
Published in:	European Journal of Operational Research. - Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217. - Vol. 216.2012, 2, p. 469-476
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Auditing \| Decision analysis \| Dynamical systems \| Economics \| Evolutionary computations \| Game theory

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574181