The ex ante incentive compatible core in exchange economies with and without indivisibilities
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Forges, Françoise |
Published in: |
Economie publique : revue de l'Institut d'Economie Publique. - Marseille, ISSN 1373-8496, ZDB-ID 1481433-X. - Vol. 17.2005, 2, p. 141-159
|
Subject: | Core | Anreiz | Incentives | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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