The ex ante incentive compatible core in exchange economies with and without indivisibilities
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Forges, Françoise |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | Core | Spieltheorie | Asymmetrische Information | Ökonomischer Anreiz | Theorie | core | incentive compatible mechanism | indivisible goods | private information |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 1686 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 510031536 [GVK] hdl:10419/19150 [Handle] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory |
Source: |
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The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies With and Without Indivisibilities
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