The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization.
The starting point of this paper is a simple, regular, dynamic game in which a subgame-perfect equilibrium fails to exist. Examination of this example shows that existence would be restored if players were allowed to observe the output of a public-randomization device. The main result of the paper shows that the introduction of public randomization yields existence not only in the example but also in a large class of dynamic games. It is also argued that the introduction of public randomization is the minimal robust extension of subgame-perfect equilibrium in this class of games. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Harris, Christopher ; Reny, Philip ; Robson, Arthur |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 63.1995, 3, p. 507-44
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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