The existence of the Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence equilibrium with continuous type distributions

Irina Gemmo, Christian Kubitza, Casey Rothschild

We prove the existence of an equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection in the sense of Miyazaki (1977), Wilson (1977), and Spence (1978) when the distribution of unobservable risk types is continuous. Our proof leverages the finite-type proof in Spence (1978) and a limiting argument akin to Hellwig (2007)'s study of optimal taxation.

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Year of publication:	[2018] ; This version: November 2018
Authors:	Gemmo, Irina ; Kubitza, Christian ; Rothschild, Casey G.
Publisher:	Frankfurt am Main : International Center for Insurance Regulation, Goethe University Frankfurt
Subject:	Asymmetric and private information \| insurance market \| adverse selection \| equilibrium \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Versicherungsmarkt \| Insurance market \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Working paper series / International Center for Insurance Regulation. - Frankfurt, Main : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2673790-5. - Vol. no. 32 (2018)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/187432 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies ; D41 - Perfect Competition
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932179