The Expectation Measure, Labor Contracts, and the Incentive to Work Hard
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | De Geest, Gerrit ; Siegers, Jacques ; Vandenberghe, Ann-Sophie |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Theorie | Theory | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Arbeitsproduktivität | Labour productivity | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Kündigung | Dismissal | Niederlande | Netherlands | Verdienstausfall | Earnings losses | Gewinn | Profit |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
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