The extractive firm's cost spillover tax for the extended hotelling model

We consider a competitive extraction industry comprising many small firms, each with a slightly different quality of mineral holdings. With rapidly declining quality of holding per firm we observe rent declining over an interval. We then take up the familiar planning model and isolate the tax required to make decentralized extraction by many distinct, competitive firms replicate the planning solution.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Hartwick, John ; Bazhanov, Andrei ; Song, Zhen
Publisher:	Kingston (Ontario) : Queen's University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Rohstoffressourcen \| Bergbau \| Rentabilität \| Unternehmenserfolg \| Steuerpolitik \| Hotelling Modell \| exhaustible resources \| resource rent \| competitive extraction \| corrective tax

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Series:	Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; 1169
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	589272403 [GVK] hdl:10419/67833 [Handle]
Classification:	D41 - Perfect Competition ; Q31 - Demand and Supply
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290418