The firm as a multicontract organization
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Laffont, Jean-Jacques |
Other Persons: | Martimort, David (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Blackwell, ISSN 1058-6407, ZDB-ID 1123863-X. - Vol. 6.1997, 2, p. 201-234
|
Subject: | Theorie der Unternehmung | Theory of the firm | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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