The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis.
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Benoit, J.P. ; Krishna, V. |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University |
Subject: | GAME THEORY |
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