The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Obara, Ichiro |
Published in: |
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 8.2008, 1
|
Publisher: |
De Gruyter |
Subject: | auction | information acquisition | full surplus extraction | hidden action | mechanism design | mixed strategy | moral hazard | private strategy | virtual implementation |
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