The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.
Year of publication: |
2006-03
|
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Authors: | Konrad, Kai A. ; Leininger, Wolfgang |
Institutions: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Dortmund |
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