The Governance of Subsidiaries : Separation of Ownership and Control.

This paper shows that pyramidal ownership - a prevalent organizational structure among French corporations - has sizeable agency costs. These agency costs arise because ownership pyramids tend to agnify the degree of separation between ownership and control: a group leader may have effective control over a subsidiary, while holding a small fraction of its cash flow rights. This hypothesis is tested on a panel of 2, 2 subsidiaries between 989 and 997.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Thesmar, D.
Subject:	OWNERSHIP \| INFORMATION \| SHAREHOLDERS

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	34 pages
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; L20 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior. General ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005035851