Extent:
Online-Ressource (XXVI, 206 p. 8 illus, online resource)
Series:
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Language: English
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index
Series Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; Introduction; Authors Notes; Contribution to the Comparative Studies Approach; Comments on the Book The Future of Chinese Capitalism; 1 General Theory; 1.1 Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market Economies; 1.2 Market-Based Firms Governance Structure and Coordinated Firms Governance Structure; 1.2.1 Firms' Governance Structures Defined by Five Dimensions; 1.2.2 The Market-Based Governance Structure Versus the Coordinated Governance Structure; 1.2.2.1 Ownership Coordination; 1.2.2.2 Interfirm Coordination
1.2.2.3 Employer--Employee Relations and Patterns of Work Organization and Control1.2.2.4 The Financing Patterns and Performance Criteria of Firms; 1.2.2.5 Competitive Capacity; 1.3 Case Studies on Two Basic Types of Firms Governance Structures; 1.3.1 The 'German and Japanese Model' for the Coordinated Firms' Governance Structure; 1.3.1.1 The Coordinated Firms' Governance Structure in the German Model; 1.3.1.2 The Coordinated Firms' Governance Structure in the Japanese Model; 1.3.1.3 Comparison of 'Coordination' Between German and Japanese Firms' Coordinated Governance Structures
1.3.2 The 'American and British Models' for the Market-Based Firms' Governance Structure1.3.2.1 The 'American Model' as a Model Case for the Market-Based Firms' Governance Structure with Arm's Length Portfolio Control; 1.3.2.2 The 'British Model' as a Model Case for the Market-Based Firms' Governance Structure with Direct Owner Control; 1.3.3 The 'Taiwanese Model' for the Market-Based Firms' Governance Structure; 1.3.3.1 Ownership Relations; 1.3.3.2 Interfirm Coordination; 1.3.3.3 Employer--Employee Relations and Labor Management
1.3.3.4 The Financing Patterns and Performance Criteria of Taiwanese Private Firms1.4 Institutional Complementarities, Continuity, and Divergence; 1.4.1 Institutional Complementarities; 1.4.1.1 Institutional Complementarities Reinforce the Difference Between Firms' Governance Structures; 1.4.1.2 Institutional Complementarities Generate Disincentives to Radical Change; 1.4.1.3 Each Type of Firms' Governance Structure Conditions its Specialization in the Production Regime and Innovation System; 1.4.2 Institutional Continuity and Divergence
1.4.2.1 The Assumption of the Economic Convergence Across Different Economies1.4.2.2 Institutional Continuity and Divergence Versus Convergence of Different Economic Models; 2 Firms Governance Structure in the Chinese State Sector; 2.1 SOE Reorganization: Keeping the Large and Letting Go of the Small ( zhuada fangxiao ); 2.1.1 ''Letting Go of the Small'' in the Competitive Industries; 2.1.2 ''Keeping the Large'' in the Strategic Industries; 2.1.2.1 Corporatization; 2.1.2.2 Ownership Diversification; 2.2 The Formation of the State Ownership Coordinated Modern Governance Structure of SOEs
2.2.1 The Corporatization of SOEs Results in High Levelsof Surplus
ISBN: 978-1-4419-0036-4 ; 978-1-4419-0035-7
Other identifiers:
10.1007/978-1-4419-0036-4 [DOI]
Source:
ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013521231