The government-taxpayer game

In this paper, we model - quantitatively – a possible realistic interaction between a tax-payer and his Government. We formalize, in a general setting, this strategic interaction. Moreover, we analyze "completely" a particular realistic sample of the general model. We determine the entire payoff space of the sample game; we find the unique Nash equilibrium of the interaction; we determine the payoff Pareto maximal boundary, conservative payoff zone and the conservative core of the game (part of Pareto boundary greater than the conservative payoff vector). Finally, we suggest possible compromise solutions between the two players. From an economic point of view, the sample chosen gives an example of normative settings, for which there is no reason (convenience), for the tax-payer, to evade the taxes or to declare less than his real income. Moreover, the two proposed compromise solutions (which realize the maximum collective gain) could be significantly applied to distinguished tax-payer (big companies and so on).