The Hold-Down Problem and the Boundaries of the Firm: Lessons from a Hidden Action Model with Endogenous Outside Option
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently, the agent can improve his future bargaining position, which gives the principal an incentive to retain sufficient control over the agent?s actions. Using respective one-period contracts, the principal can implement the efficient outcome while ?selling the shop? to the agent is sub-optimal. This provides an argument for integration if the boundary of the firm is defined by control rights rather than the entitlement to revenues.
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Schnedler, Wendelin ; Sunde, Uwe |
Publisher: |
Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |
Subject: | Theorie der Unternehmung | Organisationsstruktur | Agency Theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Anreizvertrag | Verhandlungstheorie | Outsourcing | Theorie | hidden action | moral hazard | endogenous outside option | authority | outsourcing |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | IZA Discussion Papers ; 464 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 845476343 [GVK] hdl:10419/21493 [Handle] |
Classification: | L23 - Organization of Production ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises; Privatization; Contracting Out |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262786