The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Blazy, Régis ; Weill, Laurent |
Institutions: | Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management |
Subject: | Bankruptcy | Credit Lending | Moral Hazard | Sanctions |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published by: Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Business School, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB) The text is part of a series Working papers CEB Number 07-012.RS 41 pages long |
Classification: | G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D21 - Firm Behavior |
Source: |
-
The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?
Blazy, Régis, (2007)
-
How Bankruptcy Punishment Influences the Ex-Ante Design of Debt Contracts?
Blazy, Régis, (2008)
-
Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?
Blazy, Régis, (2013)
- More ...
-
Does taking the shadow economy into account matter to measure aggregate efficiency?
Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, (2007)
-
Does financial intermediation matter for macroeconomic efficiency?
Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, (2007)
-
Le rôle des garanties dans les prêts des banques françaises
Blazy, Régis, (2006)
- More ...