The Implications of Information Lags for the Stabilization Bias and Optimal Delegation.
Year of publication: |
2007-07
|
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Authors: | Lam, Jean-Paul ; Pelgrin, Florian |
Institutions: | Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) |
Subject: | Stabilization bias | Inflation Targeting | Discretion | Commitment | Information Lag |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation |
Source: |
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