The Important Thing Is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests
This paper considers a public good game with incomplete information a?ected by extreme free-riding. We overcome this problem through the implementation of a contest in which several prizes can be awarded. For any possible distribution of wealth we identify the necessary and su?cient conditions for the equilibrium allocations to be interior for all players. At interior solutions, it is optimal for the social planner to set the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise the total expected welfare is independent of the distribution of the total prize sum among the prizes. We prove that private provision via a contest Pareto-dominates both public provision and private provision via a lottery.
Year of publication: |
2006-11
|
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Authors: | Faravelli, Marco |
Institutions: | Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e Strategie d'Impresa (DEMS), Facoltà di Economia |
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