The incentives of hedge fund fees and high-water marks
Year of publication: |
April 2016
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Authors: | Guasoni, Paolo ; Obłoj, Jan |
Published in: |
Mathematical finance : an international journal of mathematics, statistics and financial theory. - Malden, Mass. [u.a] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0960-1627, ZDB-ID 1073194-5. - Vol. 26.2016, 2, p. 269-295
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Subject: | competitive equilibrium | hedge funds | high-water marks | incentives | manager's participation | performance fees | portfolio choice | risk-shifting | Hedgefonds | Hedge fund | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Portfolio-Management | Portfolio selection | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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