The incentives of large sophisticated creditors to run on a too big to fail financial institution
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Carlson, Mark ; Rose, Jonathan |
Published in: |
Journal of financial stability. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1572-3089, ZDB-ID 2222049-5. - Vol. 41.2019, p. 91-104
|
Subject: | Bank runs | Deposit guarantee | Deposit insurance | Financial crisis | Einlagensicherung | Finanzkrise | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis | Welt | World | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Theorie | Theory | Einlagengeschäft | Deposit banking | Bankinsolvenz | Bank failure | Großbank | Large bank |
-
Shadow banking and financial stability under limited deposit insurance
Voellmy, Lukas, (2019)
-
The role of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) within the crisis management framework
Gortsos, Christos V., (2020)
-
Can a bank run be stopped? : government guarantees and the run on Continental Illinois
Carlson, Mark, (2016)
- More ...
-
Can a bank run be stopped? : government guarantees and the run on Continental Illinois
Carlson, Mark, (2016)
-
Can a bank run be stopped? : government guarantees and the run on Continental Illinois
Carlson, Mark, (2016)
-
Credit availability and the collapse of the banking sector in the 1930s
Carlson, Mark, (2015)
- More ...