The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials’ wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | van Veldhuizen, R. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Psychology. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-4870. - Vol. 39.2013, C, p. 341-356
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Bribery | Corruption | Experimental economics | Laboratory experiment |
Saved in:
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