The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings.
The ability of capital markets to distinguish firms of different value by the size of their initial equity offerings is attenuated when insiders can sell equity more than once. A model is developed in which there is price risk from holding equity between periods. When the uncertainty is small, there must be pooling in the first period. When uncertainty is large, the pooling equilibria dominate the separating equilibria. Copyright 1989 by American Finance Association.
Year of publication: |
1989
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Authors: | Gale, Ian L ; Stiglitz, Joseph E |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 44.1989, 2, p. 469-77
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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