The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies

In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

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Year of publication:	2014-07-15
Authors:	Bakó, Barna ; Tasnádi, Attila
Institutions:	Közgazdaságtudományi Kar, Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem
Subject:	Mixed duopoly \| Cournot \| Bertrand-Edgeworth

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L32 - Public Enterprises
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019315